Abstract. The effect of corporate governance may depend on a firm's financial slack. On one hand, financial slack may be spent by managers for their private benefits; a high level is likely associated with severe agency conflicts. Thus corporate governance matters more for high financial slack firms (i.e., the wasteful spending hypothesis). On the other hand, financial slack provides insurance against future uncertainties; a low level may signal deviations from the best interests of shareholders. Then corporate governance is more effective for low financial slack firms (i.e., the precautionary needs hypothesis). We differentiate the two hypotheses using the passage of antitakeover laws to identify exogenous variation in governance. Consistent with the wasteful spending hypothesis, the laws' passage has a larger negative impact on the operating and stock market performance of high financial slack firms. Further analysis shows that these firms do not invest more but become less efficient at cost management after the laws' passage.
Introduction
Is corporate governance equally important for the performance of all firms? If not, for which type of firms does it matter more? These are not trivial questions, because they can improve our understanding of corporate governance and help us design policies to promote better governance practices and protect shareholder wealth. To answer these questions, this paper attempts to examine whether corporate governance interacts with certain firm characteristics and exerts differential impacts on firm performance. Although firms are different in many dimensions, we specifically focus on financial slack, financial resources not committed to any specific use, for two reasons. First, liquid assets account for a significant fraction of total corporate wealth. Bates et al. (2009) report that the average cash-to-assets ratio of U.S. firms has steadily increased and reached 23.2% in 2006. Second, and more important, the use of financial slack is largely at the discretion of managers, and it is considered a central issue among the conflicts between managers and shareholders (Jensen 1986 ). Harford et al. (2008, p. 535) also suggest that "any discussion of the efficacy of corporate governance mechanisms to control managers must address this issue."
Given that the main goal of corporate governance is to align the interests of managers with those of shareholders, the effect of governance is likely to depend on the severity of agency conflicts within a firm. Consider two otherwise identical firms: a good one where managers always act in the best interests of shareholders and a bad one where managers are fraudulent and aggressively steal from shareholders. Suppose there is an improvement in the corporate governance of these two firms, e.g., increased monitoring of managers. Intuitively, the improvement in governance will have minimal impact on the good firm. By contrast, it will force fraudulent managers of the bad firm to reduce stealing significantly. Hence, the marginal benefit of an improvement in governance is larger for firms with severe agency conflicts; i.e., corporate governance matters more for this type of firms.
1 Harvey et al. (2004) provide empirical evidence consistent with this view; they show that the incremental benefit of debt as a governance mechanism is concentrated in firms with high expected agency costs.
However, it still remains unclear whether and how the effect of corporate governance depends on financial slack, as both high and low levels of financial slack could indicate more serious agency conflicts. On one hand, Jensen's (1986) free cash flow theory points out that financial slack is not subject to the same scrutiny and monitoring by the capital markets as externally raised funds, and self-interested managers are likely to spend these excess funds for their private benefits at the expense of shareholders. Because of the potential wasteful spending, the level of financial slack is positively related to the degree of agency conflicts. This implies that, everything else being equal, the marginal impact of corporate governance is larger for firms with high financial slack. We call this the wasteful spending hypothesis.
On the other hand, a low level of financial slack may also signal deviations from the best interests of shareholders. Because of financial market imperfections, external financing is generally more costly than internal financing (Myers and Majluf 1984) . Hence financial slack is beneficial to firms because it provides insurance against future uncertainties. This is consistent with the precautionary motive for holding cash proposed by Keynes (1936) and elaborated by Opler et al. (1999) , Lins et al. (2010) , and Disatnik et al. (2014) , among others. Consistent with this view, many studies document a positive relationship between cash holdings and firms' risk (e.g., Opler et al. 1999 , Duchin et al. 2015 . Thus low financial slack may indicate suboptimally low risk, which is probably chosen by overly conservative managers who are concerned with their job security. It could also be the case that managers do not exert enough efforts in market analysis and underestimate risk, so they hold less financial slack than the optimal level. In either case, a low level of financial slack is not in the best interests of shareholders. Then the marginal benefit of corporate governance should be larger for low financial slack firms. This prediction is in contrast to the wasteful spending hypothesis, and we name it the precautionary needs hypothesis.
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To test the two hypotheses, we follow the literature and use the passage of business combination laws (henceforth, BC laws) in different states from 1985 to 1991 to identify exogenous changes in governance. 3 These laws impose stringent restrictions on hostile takeovers of firms in the legislating state, thus reducing the disciplinary role of capital markets on managers and weakening corporate governance. They provide a natural experiment to study the effect of corporate governance as they were exogenous to most firms and were passed in a staggered manner in different states. Our main proxy for financial slack is excess cash, which is the difference between actual cash holdings and the predicted amount of cash for future liquidity and investment needs calculated from a regression as in Dittmar and Duchin (2011) , Bates et al. (2009), and Opler et al. (1999) .
Using a triple-difference approach, we find differential impacts of BC laws on firms with different levels of financial slack. On average, firms' return on assets (ROA) drops 0.5% after the passage of BC laws, and a one-standard-deviation increase in excess cash reduces ROA further by 0.53%. We also examine the impact of the laws' passage on firms' stock market performance and find similar results. Firms with more financial slack experience a larger decline in stock prices after the laws' passage. This also implies that at the time of the laws' passage, the stock market does not completely realize its full impact. Both results suggest that the weakening of corporate governance leads to a larger decline in performance of firms with higher financial slack, which is consistent with the wasteful spending hypothesis but not with the precautionary needs hypothesis. Karpoff and Wittry (2015) point out several issues that may lead to biased inference when using BC laws to identify exogenous changes in governance. Specifically, the coverage of BC laws is likely endogenous to lobbying firms and firms that used the opt-out or optin provisions of some BC laws to adjust their status. Excluding these firms from the sample does not change our results. The effect of BC laws may also depend on important court decisions that validated the constitutionality of these laws, other antitakeover laws, and firm-level antitakeover defenses. We control for these factors and continue to find similar results.
One might be concerned that a firm's financial slack is endogenous. We address this endogeneity concern in three ways. First, we directly control for a number of firm-level governance measures and other characteristics that may cause omitted variables bias. Second, we use a sticky measure of financial slack that is not affected by the laws' passage. Third, we perform twostage least squares (2SLS) estimation using two instruments for financial slack. One is the average of other firms' financial slack in the same industry incorporated in states that had not passed BC laws; the other is the average of sticky financial slack of other firms in the same state but in different industries. We continue to find supporting evidence for the wasteful spending hypothesis.
Our results also hold with various subsample analysis as robustness checks. (1) Our results could be driven by reverse causality. Some firms might expect a decline in profitability, and they lobbied to have the state pass BC laws to protect themselves. Thus, the decline in performance is the cause rather than the result of the laws' passage. Even though our results hold when we drop the list of lobbying firms, it is possible that some lobbying activities are not reported and such firms are not on the publicized list. As managers in larger firms have stronger incentives and more resources to engage in lobbying activities, we repeat the analysis excluding large firms. (2) To ensure that the results are not specific to the sample period, we repeat the analysis for different sample periods. (3) Since one-half of the sample firms are incorporated in Delaware, our results could be driven by a Delaware effect. We exclude firms incorporated in Delaware from the treatment group to address this concern. (4) Some states never passed BC laws in the sample period, so firms incorporated in these states could be fundamentally different from the rest. We repeat the analysis excluding those firms from the control group. (5) The entry of new firms and exit of old firms in the sample period may bias our results, so we analyze a subsample of firms with data available in all sample years. In all robustness checks, we continue to find that the passage of BC laws exerts a larger negative impact on high financial slack firms.
Finally, we investigate the source of the larger decline in performance for high financial slack firms. Motivated by Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003) , we focus on their investment and cost management. Because of agency conflicts, both types of activities of high financial slack firms may be associated with wasteful spending of financial slack that brings private benefits to managers. The problem can become relatively more severe for these firms after the laws' passage and explains their larger decline in performance. We find that these firms do not increase their capital expenditure; overinvestment; asset growth; property, plant, and equipment (PPE) growth; or acquisition ratio more than firms with low financial slack after the laws' passage, but they have higher overhead costs, operating expenses, costs of goods sold, and more employees relative to sales. These findings suggest that the larger decline in performance for high financial slack firms is likely due to their managers not maintaining cost efficiency.
Our study echoes the burgeoning literature on shareholder activism. Brav et al. (2008) show that hedge fund activism tends to target firms with lower growth and higher cash flows, and the activism leads to increases in payout, operating performance, and higher chief executive officer (CEO) turnover of the target firms. Our results reinforce their findings and suggest that policies aiming to improve corporate governance will be more effective by focusing on firms with high financial slack. We also contribute to the literature that examines the conditional effect of corporate governance on firm performance. In a similar setting, Giroud and Mueller (2010) show that corporate governance matters more for firms in noncompetitive industries, because the agency problem of firms in competitive industries is already mitigated by competition. Duchin et al. (2010) find that the effectiveness of outside directors is conditional on the cost of acquiring information about the firm: when the cost of acquiring information is low (high), performance improves (worsens) when outsiders are added to the board. We complement this line of research by suggesting that the importance of corporate governance varies with the level of financial slack.
Our paper is closely related to several recent papers that study the differential value of cash conditional on governance. Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007) find that cash is more valuable for well-governed firms. Frésard and Salva (2010) find that the value that investors attach to excess cash is substantially larger for foreign firms listed on U.S. exchanges than for their domestic peers. Kalcheva and Lins (2007) study international data and find that when external country-level shareholder protection is weak, firm values are lower when controlling managers hold more cash. We distinguish our paper from these studies in two ways. First, we focus on the conditional nature of corporate governance. Second, most governance measures used in these studies suffer from endogeneity, whereas we identify exogenous variation of corporate governance by using the BC laws' passage.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides background knowledge regarding the passage of state antitakeover laws. Section 3 describes the empirical methodology and the data. Section 4 discusses the main findings and various robustness checks. Section 5 studies the impact of the laws' passage on stock market performance for firms with different levels of financial slack. Section 6 investigates the source of the larger impact of BC laws on high financial slack firms. Section 7 concludes and discusses the policy implications of our findings.
State Antitakeover Laws
There are two generations of state antitakeover laws. In the 1970s, the first generation state antitakeover laws were passed by extending the Williams Act, a federal statute enacted in 1968 that regulates tender offers. These laws based their jurisdiction over tender offers on the relationship between the target and the legislating state, which is determined by a number of factors, such as the target's state of incorporation, its principal place of business, and where it holds substantial assets. However, the early laws were invalidated by a 1982 U.S. Supreme Court decision (Edgar v. Mite Corp.) on the grounds of excessive jurisdictional reach. 4 In response to this decision, states began to pass a second wave of antitakeover legislation, which was less aggressive and restricted the jurisdiction to only firms incorporated in the legislating state. The Supreme Court upheld an Indiana state control share acquisition law in 1987 (CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America) , and the U.S. court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit upheld a Wisconsin BC law in 1989 (Amanda Acquisition Corp. v. Universal Foods Corp.) . 5 The rulings generated the presumption that other antitakeover laws are also valid and stimulated further enactments of such legislations across the country.
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Most of the second-generation antitakeover statutes can be classified into business combination (BC laws), fair price, control share acquisition, poison pill, and constituency laws. BC laws impose a moratorium on certain kinds of transactions (e.g., mergers and asset sales) between a bidder and the target for a period of three to five years after the stake of the bidder has reached a threshold level. These statutes make it more costly for successful bidders to realize gains from a takeover, hence discouraging potential buyers from bidding.
Fair price laws require a bidder, when acquiring shares beyond a prespecified threshold, to pay a "fair price," which is usually determined by share prices prior to the takeover announcement. Control share acquisition laws require a bidder intending to make a "control share acquisition," defined by several threshold levels, to present its offer to the target's shareholders. If the bidder fails to comply and purchases a large block of shares, it may be disqualified from voting with these shares and will not be able to gain control until its voting rights are reinstated. Poison pill laws allow a firm to grant current shareholders the rights to buy stocks at a low price when a bidder acquires a significant amount of shares without the approval of the board. This can substantially increase takeover costs and deter potential bidders. Constituency laws allow the board of directors to take into account the interests of constituencies besides shareholders, such as employees, customers, and suppliers, when the board decides how to respond to a takeover bid. They are considered to be antitakeover statutes because they provide managers with additional resources to oppose the takeover.
To be comparable to previous studies, we follow the literature and mainly focus on BC laws in our analysis. In robustness checks, we also control for the influence of other antitakeover laws. The passage of BC laws weakens corporate governance by reducing the disciplinary role of capital markets. It provides an ideal setting to examine the conditional nature of corporate governance. First, the laws' passage can be viewed as an exogenous event to most treated firms; it is endogenous to only a small fraction of the firms, and the endogeneity concern is addressed in later sections. Second, the laws were passed at different points in time for different states. It reduces the clustering of observations at the time of the laws' passage. Finally, these laws were passed on a state basis, so they induced a common change of corporate governance in all affected firms. Holding constant the change of corporate governance in treated firms enables us to take firms with different levels of financial slack and compare their changes in performance before and after the laws' passage.
Although the BC laws' passage has been used extensively to identify exogenous variation in corporate governance, Karpoff and Wittry (2015) point out several important issues that may bias the estimation. First, the laws' coverage may be endogenous to two small groups of firms. One group is those firms that faced takeover threats and lobbied legislators to pass the laws. The other group consists of those firms that opted out of or into the coverage of the laws. Specifically, many antitakeover laws, including some BC laws, have opt-out provisions that allow affected firms to opt out of the laws. Meanwhile, the BC law of Georgia requests firms to opt into the law. Second, the BC laws were not officially declared constitutional until the court ruling on Amanda Acquisition Corp. v. Universal Foods Corp. in 1989 , so they may have differential effects before and after the ruling. Third, the effect of the BC laws may depend on the coverage by firstgeneration and other second-generation antitakeover laws. Finally, the results may be confounded by existing firm-level antitakeover provisions. We address all these issues in our empirical analysis.
Empirical Methodology and Data

Empirical Methodology
Our research question is how the passage of BC laws affects the performance of firms with varying levels of financial slack. The main regression equation is as follows:
where i, j, k, l, and t index firms, industries, states of incorporation, states of location, and years, respectively. ROA ĳkl, t is the return on assets; α i and α t are firm and year fixed effects, respectively; BC_law ĳkl, t is equal to 1 if firm i is subject to the BC law in year t and 0 otherwise; FS ĳkl, t−1 is the financial slack of firm i measured in year t − 1; X ĳkl, t is a vector of control variables; and ε ĳkl, t is the error term. In the baseline specification, X ĳkl, t includes firm size, firm age, squared terms of size and age, and two proxies for time-varying local and industry shocks, state year and industry year. We follow Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003) and define state year and industry year as the annual mean of the dependent variable in the firm's state of location and three-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) industry, respectively, excluding the firm itself. Including the two controls enables us to separate the effect of the laws' passage from other contemporaneous shocks in the state of location and the industry. It also helps address the concern that a coalition of firms located in the same state or operating in the same industry lobbied for an antitakeover law to gain better protection against hostile takeovers when they expect a decline in profitability.
Management Science, 2017 , vol. 63, no. 6, pp. 1872 -1891 , © 2016 The marginal effect of BC laws on performance is given by β 1 + β 2 × FS. We are most interested in whether and how it varies with the level of financial slack, which is captured by the coefficient of the interaction term, β 2 . The wasteful spending hypothesis predicts β 2 < 0, and the precautionary needs hypothesis predicts β 2 > 0.
In all regressions, standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and clustered at the state of incorporation level. Clustering the standard errors at the state of incorporation level accounts for three types of correlations among the error terms: across different firms in the same state of incorporation and year (crosssectional correlation), across different firms in the same state of incorporation over time (across-firm serial correlation), and within the same firm over time (withinfirm serial correlation). Cross-sectional correlation is likely since firms in the same state of incorporation are subject to the same shock in corporate governance as a result of the passage of BC laws. Serial correlation is a concern since the dummy variable of the laws' passage is persistent over time.
The regression specification is essentially a difference-in-differences-in-differences approach. The first level of difference is the performance difference of firms before and after the laws' passage. The second level is the difference of the first-level difference among firms across incorporating states with and without BC laws. The first two differences can identify the average treatment effect of the laws' passage on firm performance. The interaction term BC law × FS captures the third-level difference. It is the difference in the secondlevel differences among treated firms with different levels of financial slack. For example, suppose we want to estimate the differential impact of the New York BC law passed in 1985 on the performance of firms incorporated in New York with different levels of financial slack. First, we would compare the performance before and after 1985 for high financial slack firms incorporated in New York. The performance difference could reflect the effect of the law but could also be related to other shocks in the economy, such as an unexpected increase in oil price. To control for the impact of other contemporaneous shocks, we select a control state that had not passed the law by 1985, such as California. We compare firm performance before and after 1985 for high financial slack firms incorporated in California. Since firms incorporated in California are subject to the same economic shocks, but not to the passage of the law in New York, the difference of the two identifies the average effect of the law on high financial slack firms. Then we repeat the same process for low financial slack firms incorporated in New York and California. The difference of the final two differences would reflect the differential impact of the law's passage on high and low financial slack firms in New York.
Data and Variables
The exact years of the BC laws' passage are obtained from Karpoff and Wittry (2015) . 7 They also point out that not all firms incorporated in a state that passed an antitakeover law were affected by the law. Specifically, many antitakeover laws, including some BC laws, have opt-out provisions. For those firms that opted out of the laws' coverage, the corresponding observations are coded as not subject to the laws; i.e., the dummy variable BC law is equal to 0. Meanwhile, the Georgia BC law requires firms to opt into coverage. Therefore, firms incorporated in Georgia are considered as not subject to the BC law unless they opted into coverage. The data on firms' opt-out and opt-in decisions are taken from RiskMetrics.
We collect accounting data of all publicly listed U.S. firms from Compustat. We drop observations with missing values on total assets, sales, or operating income before depreciation. We also drop observations that have no data on any of the financial slack proxies discussed below. All financial firms are excluded because their cash reserves and cash flows may have different interpretations, and utility firms are dropped because they are highly regulated. To make our analysis comparable to the literature Mullainathan 2003, Giroud and Mueller 2010) , we choose the sample period of 1976-1995. 8 The final sample contains 8,025 firms and 68,008 firm-year observations.
Our main variable is financial slack, which is the extra financial resource not committed to future specific use such as liquidity and investment needs. Since the exact amount needed for future specific use is not directly observable, we start by using two gross proxies of a firm's overall financial resource. The first proxy is the current ratio, also known as the liquidity ratio. It is defined as the ratio of current assets to current liabilities and is a popular measure for financial slack in management literature. 9 The second proxy is cash ratio, defined as the ratio of cash and short-term investments to total assets. Practitioners in accounting and finance normally use this ratio as one of the measures for financial slack. Both variables are noisy proxies for financial slack, as they do not take into account the portion reserved for future specific needs.
Our main proxy for financial slack throughout the analysis is excess cash, which is the difference between actual cash holdings and the amount of cash committed to future specific needs, normalized by total assets. It is also referred to as "unexpected cash" (Dittmar and Duchin 2011, p. 4) and "cash residual" (Harford et al. 2008, p. 548) . Specifically, it is calculated as follows:
where CashRatio * i, t represents firm i's expected needs for cash in year t, which is unobservable and must be estimated. Following Dittmar and Duchin (2011) , we first estimate an empirical cash model similar to the one in Opler et al. (1999) and Bates et al. (2009) over a rolling five-year window [t − 5, t − 1]. The dependent variable is cash ratio, and the explanatory variables include lagged cash flow, cash flow volatility, Tobin's Q, firm size, net working capital, leverage, capital expenditure, research and development (R&D) expenditure, and the dividend payout dummy variable (variable definitions are given below). We then use the estimated model to obtain the predicted value of cash holdings of year t, CashRatio * i, t . As the regression explicitly controls for future specific financial needs, it is the cleanest among all three financial slack proxies.
We construct the rest of the variables as follows. ROA is operating income before depreciation divided by total assets. Size is the log of total assets. Age is the log of 1 plus the number of years between the first year the firm is covered in Compustat and the current year. Cash flow is earnings after interests, dividends, and taxes but before depreciation divided by total assets. Cash flow volatility is the standard deviation of cash flow in the previous five years. Tobin's Q is the ratio of the market value of assets to the book value of assets, where the market value of assets is equal to the book value of assets, plus the market value of common equity, minus the sum of the book value of common equity and deferred taxes. Net working capital is net working capital excluding cash divided by total assets. Leverage is the sum of long-term and short-term debt divided by total assets. Capital expenditure is the ratio of capital expenditure to total assets. R&D expenditure is R&D divided by sales and is set equal to 0 if R&D is missing. The dividend payout dummy equals 1 in years when a firm pays a common dividend and 0 otherwise. All continuous variables are winsorzied at 1% and 99% levels to reduce the influence of outliers.
Panel A of Table 1 provides summary statistics of the main variables used in Equation (1). The average ROA of our sample is 8.9%. The averages of current ratio, cash ratio, and excess cash are 1.176, 0.131, and 0.001, respectively. It is not surprising that the average of excess cash is close to zero because it is similar to a regression residual by construction. Panel B presents the correlations among main variables. The three financial slack proxies are highly correlated with each other, and all three have a slightly negative correlation with ROA. They are also negatively correlated with firm size and age, suggesting that larger and older firms hold less liquid assets. Table 2 presents our baseline regression results. Column (1) does not include financial slack or its interaction with BC laws' passage, whereas other columns Notes. Panel A reports the summary statistics. Panel B reports the correlation matrix. ROA is operating income before depreciation divided by total assets. Size is the log of total assets. Age is the log of 1 plus the number of years between the first year when the firm is covered by Compustat and the current year. Current ratio is current assets divided by total assets. Cash ratio is cash and short-term investments divided by total assets. Excess cash is the cash ratio minus a predicted cash ratio estimated by a five-year rolling window; the explanatory variables of the estimation regression include lagged measures of cash flow, cash flow volatility, Tobin's Q, firm size, net working capital, leverage, capital expenditure, R&D expenditure, and the dividend payout dummy variable.
Results
Baseline Regression Results
include both. Without the interaction term, the regression imposes the restriction that the laws' passage affects all firms equally, and the coefficient β 1 shows the average effect of the laws' passage on the performance of all treated firms. The coefficient on the law dummy is −0.005, suggesting that ROA drops 0.5% after the laws' passage. This is consistent with the finding of Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003) that, on average, the passage of BC laws hurts firm performance. A proxy for financial slack and its interaction term with the laws' passage are included in columns (2), (3), and (4); the proxies are current ratio, cash ratio, and excess cash, respectively. The interaction term captures the differential impact of the laws' passage conditional on the level of financial slack. From column (2) to column (4), we consistently find that the coefficient of the interaction term is significantly negative. This implies that the negative impact of the laws' passage on performance is more pronounced for those firms with more financial slack, which is consistent with the wasteful spending hypothesis but not with the precautionary needs hypothesis.
The differential effect is also economically meaningful. Take the regression of column (4) that uses excess cash as the proxy for financial slack as an example.
Management Science, 2017 , vol. 63, no. 6, pp. 1872 -1891 , © 2016 Notes. Coefficient estimates and their t-statistics (in parentheses) are presented for the following regression model:
where i, j, k, l, and t index firms, industries, states of incorporation, states of location, and time, respectively. BC_law ĳkl, t is equal to 1 if firm i incorporated in state k is under the coverage of BC laws in year t and 0 otherwise; FS is financial slack; and X is a vector of control variables, which includes firm size, firm age, squared terms of size and age, the mean ROA of other firms in the same industryyear group ("industry year"), and the mean ROA of other firms in the same state-year group ("state year"). Column (1) estimates the equation without financial slack. In columns (2), (3), and (4), financial slack is measured by current ratio, cash ratio, and excess cash, respectively, which are defined as in Table 1 . Firm and year fixed effects are included. Standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and clustered at the state of incorporation level. * , * * , and * * * denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
According to the coefficient estimates, the marginal effect of BC laws is −0.002 − 0.056 × Excess cash. It implies that an increase in excess cash by one standard deviation (0.106) is associated with a relative drop of 0.56 percentage points in ROA after the laws' passage, which is about 6% of the average ROA of our sample.
In columns (2) and (3), the coefficient estimates on the stand-alone current ratio and cash ratio are significantly negative. In column (3), the coefficient on the excess cash is negative but statistically insignificant. Combined with the negative coefficients on the interaction terms, these results imply that the average effect of financial slack on firm performance is negative. This is also consistent with the wasteful spending hypothesis but not with the precautionary needs hypothesis.
The signs of coefficient estimates on firm size, firm age, and their squared terms are as expected. As a firm becomes larger or older, its ROA increases first, and then decreases, which is an inverted U-shaped relationship. We also obtain positive and highly significant coefficient estimates on the two proxies for local and industry shocks, which confirms the necessity to control for them.
Using BC Laws' Passage for Identification
As mentioned in Section 2, there are several important issues that may generate biased inference when using BC laws to identify exogenous variation in corporate governance (Karpoff and Wittry 2015) .
First, although it is exogenous to most firms, the laws' coverage is likely endogenous to those firms lobbying for specific state antitakeover laws. In most cases, the lobbying firm was the target of an actual or rumored takeover bid, and the state passed antitakeover legislation quickly upon such news. It is obvious that there exists the possibility of reverse causality for this group of firms. Karpoff and Wittry (2015) identify nearly 30 lobbying firms that motivated BC laws. The small quantity of firms involved in lobbying activities is consistent with Romano (1987) , who concludes that BC laws are unlikely caused by broad-based lobbying. We exclude the lobbying firms from the analysis to directly address the endogeneity concern. The results remain qualitatively unchanged and are presented in column (1) of Table 3 .
Second, endogeneity is also a concern for the group of firms that exercised the opt-out or opt-in options offered by some BC laws because whether they are covered by the laws reflects their endogenous choice. In our sample, 26 firms opted out of the coverage of their states' BC laws, and three firms incorporated in Georgia opted into coverage. The small quantity is probably due to the significant adjustment costs. For example, opting out of the Ohio BC law requires the approval of at least two-thirds of the outstanding shares and twothirds of the outstanding shares not owned by a 10% stockholder. Moreover, the opt-out would be ineffective for 12 months and would not apply to a control transaction of a shareholder with more than 10% shares before the approval of the opt-out amendment. Therefore, the laws' coverage is still exogenous to most firms because the high transaction costs prevent them from making adjustment (Karpoff and Wittry 2015) . Nevertheless, we drop firms that opted out of or opted into Notes. This table reports the regression analysis that deals with various issues of using BC laws' passage for identification. We consider the influence of lobbying firms, firms that opted in or out of state antitakeover laws, first-generation and other second-generation state antitakeover laws, and the legal regime as reflected in important court decisions. BC law before ruling equals 1 if the law was effective in year t < 1989 and 0 otherwise. BC law after ruling equals 1 if the law was effective in year t ≥ 1989 and 0 otherwise. Fair price, Control share, Poison pill, and Constituency are dummy variables that stand for the passage of fair price laws, control share laws, poison pill laws, and constituency laws, respectively. All other variables are defined as in Tables 1 and 2 . Column (1) drops all lobbying firms; column (2) drops all firms that opted in or opted out of BC laws as well as lobbying firms; column (3) additionally controls for all four types of second-generation antitakeover laws and their interactions with excess cash on the basis of column (2); column (4) additionally drops observations from 1976 to 1982 to exclude the effect of first-generation antitakeover laws that were deemed unconstitutional in 1982, on the basis of column (3); and column (5) additionally studies the differential effect of BC laws before and after the court ruling on Amanda Acquisition Corp. v. Universal Foods Corp. in 1989 that established the constitutional status of BC laws, on the basis of column (4). Firm and year fixed effects are included. Standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and clustered at the state of incorporation level. * , * * , and * * * denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Management Science, 2017 , vol. 63, no. 6, pp. 1872 -1891 , © 2016 coverage as well as lobbying firms, and we continue to find similar results, as shown in column (2) of Table 3 . Third, the effect of BC laws may be influenced by four other types of second generation antitakeover laws passed during the sample period, which are fair price, control share acquisition, poison pill, and constituency laws. To control for their influence, we construct four dummy variables: Fair price, Control share, Poison pill, and Constituency. They are equal to 1 if the corresponding laws are effective and 0 otherwise. We then add the four dummies and their interactions with excess cash into the regression of column (2) and present the results in column (3). Admittedly, including these other laws reduces the magnitude of the coefficient estimate on the interaction term BC law × Excess cash, but it remains significant in the new regression.
10 It is also worth pointing out that, among the additional control variables, Poison pill × Excess cash is negative and statistically significant. Hence poison pill laws also exert a negative impact on firm performance conditional on excess cash. This is supportive to the finding of Karpoff and Wittry (2015) , that poison pill laws affect firm policies and performance through takeover protection.
Fourth, a related concern is that some of the firstgeneration antitakeover laws were also effective in the early years of the sample period, and part of the BC laws' effect we observe could come from these laws. To address this concern, we rerun the regression of column (3), excluding observations during the 1976-1982 period. Because the first-generation antitakeover laws were deemed unconstitutional in 1982, the sample period after 1982 is free from their impact.
11 Column (4) presents the results and shows that the coefficient on BC law × Excess cash remains significant. We conclude that controlling for the firs-generation and other second-generation antitakeover laws does not change our main finding.
Fifth, the impact of BC laws may depend on the legal environment. The constitutionality of BC laws was not established until a ruling by the U.S. Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit in Amanda Acquisition Corp. v. Universal Foods Corp. on May 24, 1989 . Before the court ruling, it was uncertain how much protection against takeover bids that BC laws could offer. Thus it is possible that the impact of BC laws became meaningful only after the ruling. To differentiate the effects before and after the ruling, we replace the law dummy and the interaction term in the baseline regression with two dummy variables, BC law before ruling and BC law after ruling, as well as their interactions with excess cash. BC law before ruling is the same as the dummy BC law for any year t < 1989, and it is equal to 0 for t ≥ 1989. Similarly, BC law after ruling is the same as BC law for any year t ≥ 1989, and it is equal to 0 for t < 1989. By construction, the two dummies capture the effect of BC laws before and after the ruling, respectively. The results in column (5) of Table 3 show that the two dummies have insignificant coefficient estimates, but their interactions with Excess cash enter the regression negatively and significantly. That is, both before and after the ruling, the negative impact of BC laws is stronger for firms with more excess cash. This suggests that our previous finding is not driven by the ruling on the Amanda Acquisition Corp. v. Universal Foods Corp. case.
Endogeneity of Financial Slack
Financial slack, as a part of a firm's liquidity management, is likely to be endogenous. In particular, both firm performance and financial slack can be jointly determined at equilibrium and are both driven by other firm characteristics. There is omitted variables bias if these characteristics are not accounted for. In the earlier baseline specification, we address this concern with two considerations. First, we use excess cash as the main proxy for financial slack, which is the difference between actual and expected cash holdings. When estimating expected cash holdings, we control for a number of firm characteristics that capture a firm's specific needs for cash, so excess cash is unlikely a response to changes in these firm characteristics. Perhaps this is why it is called "unexpected cash" in Dittmar and Duchin (2011) . Second, we include firm fixed effects in all regressions to control for unobserved time-invariant firm characteristics.
Nevertheless, excess cash can still be correlated with some other time-varying firm characteristics that are not included in the regression of estimating expected cash holdings. Our results are biased if they are correlated with firm performance and are not taken into account. In this section, we tackle the problem in three ways. First, we control for various firm-level governance measures and other characteristics that may cause the omitted variables bias. Second, we construct a sticky measure of financial slack that is not affected by the laws' passage. This sticky measure can address the concern that the passage of BC laws induces a change in financial slack that is correlated with time-varying omitted variables. Third, we construct two instrumental variables to identify exogenous variation in financial slack and conduct 2SLS estimation.
Firm-Level Governance Measures and Other
Characteristics. Some firms adopt antitakeover provisions to protect themselves from takeover threats. If these provisions affect firm performance and are correlated with financial slack, the regression results will be biased. To address this concern, we control for a firm's takeover defenses using the G-index proposed by Gompers et al. (2003) . Martĳn Cremers graciously shared with us his hand-collected G-index data for the period of 1977-1989, as described in Cremers and Ferrell (2014) . We then complement these data with the G-index data of 1990-1995 provided by RiskMetrics.
We control for the G-index as a stand-alone variable and interact it with the law dummy in the regression; we present the results in column (1) of panel A of Table 4 . We find that firms with a higher G-index on average indeed perform worse than their peers, but there is no differential impact of BC laws conditional on the G-index. Meanwhile, the interaction term of BC law and financial slack continues to be negative and significant.
A related concern is that other governance measures may also be related to financial slack and affect firm performance. We use data on CEO ownership, CEO compensation structure, CEO duality, board size, and board independence to control for these effects. CEO ownership is the percentage of a firm's equity owned by its CEO. CEO compensation structure is measured by CEO equity pay, which is 1 minus the percentage of cash pay including salary and bonus. CEO duality is a dummy variable that is 1 if the CEO is also the chairperson of the board and 0 otherwise. Board size is Yermack (1996) . For the period of 1992-1995, we obtain CEO compensation data from ExecuComp and ownership and board characteristics from Compact Disclosure. To be consistent, we only include past and current Forbes 500 companies. After deleting observations with missing values on excess cash, the final sample contains fewer than 5,000 firm-year observations. To avoid multicollinearity, we separately add these governance variables and their interactions with the law dummy into the regression, and we present the results in columns (2)-(6) of panel A of Table 4 . Although CEO duality and board size are negatively associated with firm performance, we find no evidence that the effect of BC laws on firm performance is conditional on these governance Management Science, 2017 , vol. 63, no. 6, pp. 1872 -1891 , © 2016 
Here, Z ĳkl, t−1 is the additional firm characteristic to be controlled for. All other variables are defined as in Tables 1 and 2 . Coefficients on the control variables are not reported for the sake of brevity. Firm and year fixed effects are included. Standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and clustered at the state of incorporation level. In panel A, Z ĳkl, t−1 is G-index, CEO ownership, CEO equity pay, CEO duality, board size, and board independence in columns (1), (2), (3), (4), (5), and (6), respectively. CEO ownership is the percentage of a firm's equity owned by the CEO. CEO equity pay is 1 minus the percentage of cash pay including salary and bonus. CEO duality is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the CEO is also the chairperson of the board and 0 otherwise. Board size is the log of the number of board directors. Board independence is the percentage of directors that are qualified as outsiders. In panel B, Z ĳkl, t−1 is the lagged value of industry HHI, Tobin's Q, cash flow (CF) volatility, and leverage in columns (1), (2), (3), and (4), respectively. Column (5) includes the squared term of excess cash. * , * * , and * * * denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
measures. Meanwhile, the interaction term BC law × Excess cash is significant at the 10% level in all regressions except the one with board size (t statistic 1.63, p-value 0.103). The decrease in statistical significance of these regressions is likely due to the much smaller sample size, which is about one-tenth of that of the baseline regression.
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Besides firm-level governance measures, other firm characteristics may also affect our results. Giroud and Mueller (2010) show that the passage of BC laws has a larger negative impact on the operating performance of firms in less competitive industries. Given that firms in less competitive industries are more likely to enjoy higher profits and have more financial slack, it is possible that our results just manifest the findings in Giroud and Mueller (2010) . To control for the effect of competition on the importance of corporate governance, we include the industry Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI) in the regression analysis. The industry HHI is defined as the sum of squared market shares of firms with the same three-digit SIC code, where the market shares are calculated based on sales. Column (1) of Table 4 , panel B, adds the HHI and its interaction with the law dummy variable to the baseline specification. Consistent with the findings of Giroud and Mueller (2010) , the coefficient estimate on the interaction term BC law × HHI is negative and significant. Meanwhile, we continue to find a significant coefficient estimate on BC law × Excess cash.
A firm's financial slack may be related to its investment opportunities. If a firm's investment opportunities also affect the importance of corporate governance, our findings could be driven by the difference in investment opportunities rather than in agency costs. To address this concern, we control for lagged Tobin's Q and its interaction with the law dummy variable. The results are shown in column (2) of Table 4 , panel B. Although Tobin's Q is significant, its interaction term with the law dummy variable is not. More importantly, controlling for Tobin's Q does not change our main findings.
Another issue is that the accounting performance measure ROA is not adjusted by risk. Thus, a decline in ROA may result from lower asset risk. Before the passage of BC laws, firms may invest excessively in highly risky projects to appear more profitable to deter hostile bidders. After the laws' passage, this incentive is weakened, and firms may choose to switch to less risky projects, which command lower returns. Meanwhile, firms with abundant financial slack are more likely to be the targets of hostile takeovers, which implies that they have stronger incentives to take risky projects than low financial slack firms before the laws' passage. Our findings may just reflect changes in the asset risk of high financial slack firms. To test this alternative hypothesis, we follow Zhang (2006) and use cash flow volatility as a measure for asset risk. As defined in Section 3.2, cash flow volatility is the standard deviation of cash flows in the past five years. Column (3) of Table 4 , panel B presents the results of the regression that includes cash flow volatility and its interaction with the law dummy. Although the two additional controls are both significant, the positive coefficient on the interaction of cash flow volatility and the law dummy is inconsistent with the alternative story. More important, our main results remain qualitatively unchanged.
Firms with more financial slack tend to use less debt. Given that external debt is a device of monitoring managers, it could be a substitute governance mechanism for the market of corporate control. When the takeover market is weakened by the laws' passage, overall governance should be hurt more for low leverage firms. Our results might just reflect the substitution between debt monitoring and the takeover market. Column (4) of Table 4 , panel B tests this hypothesis by including lagged leverage and its interaction with the law dummy variable in the baseline specification. The coefficient on the interaction term of the laws' passage and leverage is significantly positive, suggesting that the laws' passage hurts firms with lower leverage more. This means that debt monitoring and the takeover market are indeed substitutes. However, our main results remain robust.
Suppose firm performance is related to financial slack in a nonlinear way and the laws' passage affects all firms equally. A regression that ignores the nonlinear relationship between firm performance and financial slack could produce a dubious relationship between performance and the interaction term of the laws' passage and financial slack. To check this possibility, we add the squared term of excess cash to the baseline specification. The results in column (5) of Table 4 , panel B show that our findings are robust to this alternative specification.
A Sticky Measure of Financial Slack.
One might be concerned that the laws' passage drives variation in financial slack and that the variation is correlated with omitted determinants of firm performance, leading to biased estimation. To address this concern, we construct a sticky measure of financial slack so that it is measured by the levels before the coverage of BC laws. Specifically, if a firm is subject to the BC law starting in year τ, then for any t < τ, financial slack is measured in year t; for any t ≥ τ, financial slack is measured in year τ − 1.
By construction, this new measure is sticky and not affected by the passage of BC laws. Furthermore, its sticky nature suggests that it is less likely correlated with omitted variables that cause the bias unless there are anticipation effects or the omitted variables are persistent. Column (1) of Table 5 presents the results of the baseline regression using the sticky measure of excess cash.
14 The interaction term between the BC law dummy and excess cash is negative and highly significant, consistent with our previous findings.
Since the sticky financial slack variable remains constant when the firm is subject to the BC law, one concern is that it conveys little information about the firm's actual financial slack many years after the law's coverage when using the whole sample period. For example, the BC law was passed in New York in 1985, and the sample period ends in 1995. This means that the sticky measure of financial slack does not change from 1985 to 1995 for firms covered by New York's BC law. To address this issue, we repeat the analysis and use the sample period that begins n years before the law change and ends n years after, n 1, 2, 3, 4. Columns (2)- (5) of Table 5 present the results. In all regressions, the coefficient estimates of the interaction term remain consistently negative and highly significant. 
2SLS Estimation.
A more general solution to the endogeneity problem is to find an instrumental variable for financial slack, which is correlated with a firm's financial slack but not its performance. We construct two instruments for financial slack.
For the financial slack of firm i in year t, the first instrument is peer financial slack, defined as the average financial slack of other firms in year t in the Management Science, 2017 , vol. 63, no. 6, pp. 1872 -1891 , © 2016 Notes. This table reports the results of the baseline regression using the sticky measure of excess cash, which is measured by the level of excess cash before the coverage of BC laws. Specifically, if a firm is subject to the BC law starting in year τ, then for any t < τ, excess cash is measured in year t; for any t ≥ τ, excess cash is measured in year τ − 1. Column (1) estimates the whole sample from 1976 to 1995.
Columns (2), (3), (4), and (5) estimate the subperiods starting n years before and ending n years after the laws' coverage, with n equal to 1, 2, 3, and 4, respectively. All other variables are defined as in Tables 1  and 2 . Firm and year fixed effects are included. Standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and clustered at the state of incorporation level. * , * * , and * * * denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. same industry as firm i but incorporated in states that have not passed the BC law by year t. 16 Accordingly, the instrument for the interaction term is the interaction of peer financial slack with the law dummy. Columns (1)- (3) of Table 6 present the 2SLS regression results using excess cash as the measure for financial slack. Columns (1) and (2) show the first-stage results, where the dependent variables are excess cash and its interaction with the law dummy, respectively. Column (3) presents the second-stage results. Consistent with the ordinary least squares regression results, the coefficient estimate of the interaction term is negative and highly significant.
The first-stage regressions show that the two endogenous variables are highly correlated with the two instruments. This is not surprising since the peer financial slack is constructed from a firm's industry peers and the financial slack of firms in the same industry is likely affected by common industry shocks. Regarding the exclusion restriction, one concern is that some of those shocks may also impact firm performance, but the control variable industry year already takes this into account. Furthermore, this instrument is unlikely to be correlated with performance changes caused by the laws' passage, because it is not affected by BC laws by construction. However, peer financial slack may affect a firm's performance directly. In particular, it may be a proxy for rivals' financial strength and could exert a negative impact on the firm (Bolton and Scharfstein 1990) . If this is true, then the instrument violates the exclusion restriction and the inference is biased.
Given that peer financial slack may not satisfy the exclusion restriction, we construct an alternative instrument, local sticky financial slack, which is the average sticky financial slack of other firms in the same state but not in the same industry. The sticky measure of financial slack is defined as in Section 4.3.2. This instrument is likely to be correlated with financial slack because the financial slack of firms in the same state is probably affected by some common local shocks at the state level. It is possible that these shocks also affect firm performance, but their impacts are already accounted for by the control variable state year. Furthermore, this instrument is not affected by the laws' passage since it is constructed from the sticky measure of financial slack. Most important, its construction does not include firms in the same industry, so it does not proxy for rival firms' financial strength. Therefore, it is likely to satisfy the exclusion restriction. Accordingly, its interaction with the law dummy serves as the Notes. This table reports the results of 2SLS regressions. In columns (1)-(3), the instrumental variable for excess cash is peer excess cash, defined as the average excess cash of firms in the same industry but incorporated in states that have not passed BC laws; its interaction with the law dummy serves as the instrument for the interaction of excess cash with the law dummy. Columns (1) and (2) show the first-stage regression results, and column (3) shows the second-stage regression results. In columns (4)-(6), the instrumental variable for excess cash is local sticky excess cash, defined as the average sticky pre-law level of excess cash of firms located in the same state but in different industries; its interaction with the law dummy serves as the instrument for the interaction of excess cash with the law dummy. Columns (4) and (5) show the first-stage regression results, and column (6) shows the second-stage regression results. All other variables are defined as in Tables 1 and 2 . Firm and year fixed effects are included. Standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and clustered at the state of incorporation level. * , * * , and * * * denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
instrument for the interaction of financial slack and the law dummy. The 2SLS regression results are presented in columns (4)-(6) of Table 6 . The first-stage regressions are in columns (4) and (5), where the dependent variables are excess cash and its interaction with the law dummy, respectively. The results show that the two endogenous variables are indeed significantly correlated with the two instruments. Column (6) presents the second-stage regression results and shows that the coefficient estimate of the interaction term is significantly negative, which is consistent with our previous findings.
In summary, we address the endogeneity concern of financial slack in three ways. Although they can address the endogeneity of financial slack to some extent, they also have their own shortcomings. First, directly controlling for more firm characteristics can reduce omitted variables bias, but it is always possible that some unobservable time-varying variables cause the bias. Second, the sticky measure of financial slack could be correlated with omitted variables that affect firm performance if there are anticipation effects or the omitted variables are persistent. In that case, the estimation would be biased. Finally, as the exclusion restriction is untestable, it is uncertain whether the instruments are truly exogenous to firm performance. Management Science, 2017 , vol. 63, no. 6, pp. 1872 -1891 , © 2016 Therefore, the three methods might not be perfect individually. However, that the results are robust in all these specifications provides support for our findings.
4.4. Robustness Checks 4.4.1. Subsample Analysis. We repeat the analysis using different subsamples to address various concerns. First, an alternative interpretation of our regression results is reverse causality: the passage of BC laws could be the result of expected decline in profitability rather than the cause of it. Some firms might foresee that they will experience a decline in profitability as a result of common negative economic shocks, especially the ones with financial slack. As a result, these firms lobby the state to pass BC laws to protect themselves. We addressed this problem in Section 4.2 directly by excluding lobbying firms. But some lobbying activities might not be publicized, and our list of lobbying firms could be incomplete. Here, we address the possibility of reverse causality directly by excluding large firms from our sample. From a cost and benefit perspective, managers in larger firms have stronger incentives and more resources to engage in lobbying activities. When the passage of the laws is indeed driven by lobbying activities of a group of large firms incorporated in the same state expecting profit decline, the event is still Notes. This table reports the results of the baseline regression model as in Table 2 using various subsamples. All variables are defined as in Tables 1 and 2 . Column (1) excludes large firms whose assets are above sample median. Column (2) examines a symmetric time period of [1984] [1985] [1986] [1987] [1988] [1989] [1990] [1991] [1992] . Column (3) excludes firms incorporated in Delaware from the treatment group. Column (4) excludes firms incorporated in states that never passed BC laws in the sample period. Column (5) The results are presented in column (1) of Table 7 . 17 We continue to find that the passage of BC laws hurts the performance of high financial slack firms more.
Second, in the baseline regression, we choose the sample period from 1976 to 1995 to be consistent with Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003) and Giroud and Mueller (2010) . To check whether our results depend on a specific sample period, we repeat the analysis using different time intervals. Since the first BC law was passed in 1985 and the last one was passed in 1991, we choose alternative sample periods that are symmetric around the period of 1985-1991 by expanding the period by one, two, three, and four years on each end. Our main results still hold for the four different sample periods. For brevity, we only report the results based on the period of 1984-1992 in column (2) of Table 7 . Other sample periods produce similar results.
Third, since half of the sample firms are incorporated in Delaware, one might suspect that our results are merely a Delaware effect. To address this concern, we exclude all Delaware firms from the treatment group and repeat the regression analysis. Column (3) of Table 7 shows that our main result does not change.
Fourth, some firms are incorporated in states that never passed BC laws during the sample period. These firms are used as part of the control group in the regression. One might suggest that firms incorporated in states that never passed the laws are fundamentally different from those incorporated in other states. This questions the validity of using these firms as controls. Column (4) of Table 7 conducts the analysis using only firms incorporated in states that passed BC laws at some point between 1976 and 1995. The control group in any year t only includes firms incorporated in states that have not passed the law by year t but later did. Our finding is robust to this specification.
Fifth, one might be concerned with the entry of new firms and the exit of old firms during the sample period. If a firm's decision regarding where to incorporate is endogenous and affected by whether a particular state has passed BC laws, including firms that enter the sample during the sample period could induce a selection bias. Another possibility is that our finding is caused by survivorship bias in the data. Ex ante, the laws' passage affects all firms equally, but firms with low financial slack that experience decline in performance enter bankruptcy and drop out of the sample. As a result, we observe all high financial slack firms, and only a fraction of low financial slack firms that perform relatively better. On average, it appears that after the laws' passage, firms with more financial slack perform worse. To address the issue of firm entry and exit, we repeat the analysis with the subsample of firms that have performance data available in the whole sample period and present the results in column (5) of Table 7 . Our main finding continues to hold.
More Robustness Checks.
We conduct more analysis to check the robustness of our main finding.
18 So far, our measure for accounting performance is ROA before depreciation. We also perform the analysis using four alternative performance measures: ROA after depreciation, return on equity (ROE), net profit margin, and sales growth. ROA after depreciation is the ratio of operating income after depreciation to total assets. ROE is the ratio of net income to common equity. Net profit margin is defined as operating income before depreciation divided by sales. Sales growth is the annual growth rate of sales. The results are qualitatively the same.
When estimating excess cash, we normalize cash by total assets, following Bates et al. (2009) and Dittmar and Duchin (2011) . We also find similar results if we normalize cash by net assets (total assets excluding cash) or sales. Furthermore, there are also studies that use the natural logarithm of the cash-to-net-assets ratio or cash-to-sales ratio (e.g., Opler et al. 1999 , Harford et al. 2008 . Using these measures to estimate excess cash does not change our main finding.
In all regressions, standard errors are clustered at the state of incorporation level because the BC law dummy is a possible source of both cross-sectional and serial correlations, as discussed in Section 3.1. As a robustness check, we follow Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003) and Bertrand et al. (2004) and consider a number of alternative methods to correct correlations in the error term. We find similar results if we cluster the standard errors at the state of location level, if we use an first-order autoregression correction method, or if we block bootstrap the standard errors using 51 blocks with 200 bootstrap samples.
Stock Market Performance
In a previous analysis, we use the firm accounting performance as the main dependent variable when studying the effect of the laws' passage on performance. If the stock market is unable to fully anticipate the effect of BC laws, stock performance should also be affected. We construct characteristics-adjusted annual returns to measure the stock performance as in Daniel et al. (1997) . Specifically, at the end of each calendar year, we classify stocks into size quintiles based on their market capitalization using the breakpoints determined by NYSE stocks. Stocks in each quintile are further split into quintiles based on their book-to-market ratios. We then assign stocks in each of the 25 groups into quintiles based on their past six-month returns. This generates 125 benchmark portfolios based on size, book-to-market ratios, and past returns. We calculate the equally weighted return for each group and use it as the benchmark portfolio return. A stock's adjusted annual return is defined as the difference between its raw return and the return of its benchmark portfolio.
We use the adjusted annual stock return as the dependent variable and estimate a specification similar to Equation (1). The purpose is to examine how the laws' passage affects stock market performance differently across firms with different levels of financial slack. Because size has been accounted for when calculating the adjusted return, we do not include size or square of size in the regression. The results are presented in Table 8 . For all three measures of financial slack, the coefficient estimates on the interaction between BC laws and financial slack are negative and highly significant. Similar to accounting performance, stocks of high financial slack firms perform worse than those of low financial slack firms after the laws' passage. One potential explanation is that investors underestimate the larger negative impact of BC laws on high financial slack firms. An alternative explanation is that the interaction term is correlated with some risk characteristics that are priced but are not controlled for. Management Science, 2017 , vol. 63, no. 6, pp. 1872 -1891 , © 2016 Notes. Coefficient estimates and their t-statistics (in parentheses) are presented for the following regression model:
where R ĳkl, t is the characteristics-adjusted annual stock return of firm i, constructed using benchmark portfolios based on size, bookto-market ratios, and past returns. Industry year is the mean-adjusted return of other firms in the same industry-year group. State year is the mean-adjusted return of other firms in the same state-year group. All other variables are defined as in Tables 1 and 2 . Firm and year fixed effects are included. Standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and clustered at the state of incorporation level. * , * * , and * * * denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
In unreported regressions, we include additional control variables and find similar results. Although this reduces the concern of omitted variables bias, we cannot fully rule out its possibility.
Channels of Wasteful Spending
We have shown that the passage of BC laws leads to a larger decline in the performance of firms with high financial slack. This is consistent with the argument that the laws' passage weakens corporate governance and exacerbates agency conflicts associated with Jensen's (1986) free cash flow problem; i.e., managers with excess financial resources tend to engage in more wasteful spending. It would be interesting to find out what kind of wasteful spending is behind the performance drop of high financial slack firms after the laws' passage. In particular, managers can engage in "empire building" to entrench themselves with more resources under control. Alternatively, because greater financial slack provides a comfort zone to managers, they may just enjoy a "quiet life" and do not work as hard to minimize costs. They may spend resources beyond the optimal level to avoid "cognitively difficult activities" Mullainathan 2003, p. 1067) , such as negotiating with suppliers, labor unions, and business units within the firm demanding bigger overhead budgets. Motivated by these two conjectures, we investigate firms' investment activities and cost management to identify the channels of wasteful spending of high financial slack firms after the passage of BC laws. Table 9 presents the empirical results.
In panel A, we estimate the baseline specification using five proxies for investment activities as the dependent variable. Column (1) uses the ratio of capital expenditure to total assets. Column (2) uses a measure for overinvestment, which is the difference between the actual investment and expected investment calculated from a regression model based on Richardson (2006) .
19 Column (3) uses the annual growth rate of total assets. Column (4) uses the annual growth rate of fixed assets. Column (5) uses the acquisition ratio, defined as the sum of the value of all acquisitions made by the firm in a given year divided by the firm's market capitalization in that year.
The coefficients on the stand-alone excess cash are consistently positive across all regressions, implying that, indeed, firms with more financial slack on average engage in more investment activities. However, the average effect of the laws' passage is insignificant. Most important, the coefficients on BC law × Excess cash are mostly insignificant. This means that, although firms with more financial slack on average tend to engage in more investment and expansion, such a tendency is not exacerbated by the passage of the BC laws. In column (3), with asset growth as the dependent variable, the coefficient on the interaction term is significantly negative, which suggests that the positive relationship between asset growth and financial slack is actually moderated by the laws' passage. Overall the results do not seem to suggest that the larger performance drop of high financial slack firms after the laws' passage is due to relatively more investment and expansion.
Panel B focuses on the cost management of firms before and after the passage of BC laws. We estimate the same regression using six proxies for cost management as the dependent variable. The proxies include overhead costs (selling, general, and administrative expenses), advertising expenses, operating expenses, costs of goods sold (COGS), the number of employees, and wages. 20 All variables are normalized by sales except that wages are normalized by the number of employees. Managers in high financial slack firms In panel A, column (1), Y is capital expenditure divided by total assets. In column (2), Y is overinvestment divided by total assets, where overinvestment is constructed with the regression model of Richardson (2006) , as described in the appendix. In column (3), Y is asset growth, the percentage increase in total assets from one year to the next. In column (4), Y is PPE growth, the percentage increase in fixed assets. In column (5), Y is acquisition ratio, defined as the sum of the value of all acquisitions made by the firm in a given year divided by the firm's market capitalization in that year. The acquisition data are collected from the Securities Data Corporation's database. In panel B, column (1), Y is the overhead costs (selling, general, and administrative expenses) divided by sales. In column (2), Y is the advertising expenses divided by sales. In column (3), Y is the operating expenses divided by sales. In column (4), Y is the COGS divided by sales. In column (5), Y is the number of employees divided by sales. In column (6), Y is wages, measured by the natural logarithm of labor and related expenses divided by the number of employees. All other variables are defined as in Tables 1 and 2 . For the sake of brevity, coefficients on the control variables are not reported. Firm and year fixed effects are included. Standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and clustered at the state of incorporation level. * , * * , and * * * denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
might not work as hard to maintain cost efficiency after the passage of BC laws. Indeed, the positive and significant interaction terms in columns (1), (3), (4), and (5) suggest that firms with high financial slack experience an increase in overhead costs, operating expenses, costs of goods sold, and the number of employees after the laws' passage. This provides direct evidence that inefficient cost management, a type of wasteful spending, is behind the larger performance drop of high financial slack firms after the laws' passage. We want to emphasize that our main goal in this section is not to test the "empire building" hypothesis versus the "quiet life" hypothesis. Instead, the analysis aims to examine the channels of wasteful spending derived from the two hypotheses. In actuality, the two sets of proxies are imperfect and may be related to both building an empire and enjoying the quiet life.
21
In particular, the dependent variables of panel A could also represent substantial cash outlays, so an increase in these proxies might suggest that managers do not prudently monitor the use of financial slack and thus enjoy a quiet life. On the other hand, all the dependent variables of panel B could also be positively related to empire-building activities. Increasing overhead costs, advertising, and the number of employees is often an indication of a greater scale of operations and suggests possible empire building. Therefore, the empirical evidence might actually provide some support to both hypotheses. However, whether it is empire building or enjoying the quiet life is not crucial for this study; what really matters is that the analysis provides direct evidence and identifies the channel of wasteful spending by managers of high financial slack firms after the laws' passage.
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Conclusion
In this paper, we examine whether and how the effect of corporate governance depends on the level of financial slack. From a theoretical standpoint, corporate governance matters more for firms with more severe agency problems because its main goal is to mitigate agency conflicts. However, the relationship between financial slack and agency conflicts is ambiguous. On one hand, the use of financial slack is largely at the discretion of managers and lacks discipline from the capital market, so managers may spend financial slack for their private benefits at the expense of shareholders (Jensen 1986 ). This implies that agency conflicts are potentially more severe for firms with high financial slack, and corporate governance should be more effective for this type of firm. On the other hand, financial slack can serve as a precautionary savings mechanism and protect firms against future economic and political uncertainties, but self-interested managers can be imprudent and hold insufficient financial slack. In this case, a low level of financial slack signals more severe agency problems, and corporate governance should matter more for firms with low financial slack.
Using the passage of BC laws to identify exogenous variation in corporate governance, we find that the weakening of corporate governance causes a larger decline in performance of firms with high financial slack. This finding has important policy implications. It suggests that governance mechanisms do not matter equally for all firms; instead, shareholder activism and government regulations aiming to improve corporate governance can be more effective by targeting firms with high financial slack.
In a nutshell, our paper investigates a particular aspect of the conditional nature of corporate governance, i.e., whether and how financial slack affects the effectiveness of corporate governance. It would be interesting for future research to examine whether and how the functioning of corporate governance depends on other firm traits, industry characteristics, macroeconomic environment, and other factors. This would further deepen our understanding of corporate governance and help implement governance mechanisms to better address the conflicts between shareholders and managers.
instrument. When a firm is incorporated in a state that has passed a BC law, other firms in the same state are not included. 17 Dropping the top 10%, 20%, 30%, or 40% of firms ranked by size produces similar results. 18 For the sake of brevity, these results are not reported but are available upon request. 19 Following Richardson (2006) , we construct the measure for overinvestment in two steps. First, we define new investment as total investment less required expenditure to maintain assets in place, where total investment is the sum of all outlays on capital expenditure, acquisitions, and research and development less receipts from the sale of property, plant, and equipment; the required expenditure to maintain assets in place is amortization and depreciation. Second, we use new investment as the dependent variable to fit a regression model, and the residual is used as the proxy for overinvestment. The regression's explanatory variables include a firm's growth opportunities, book value of common equity, annual dividends, operating income after depreciation, leverage, size, age, stock of cash, past stock returns, prior investment, year fixed effects, and industry fixed effects. 20 Because many Compustat firms do not report wages, the number of observations is much smaller in column (6) compared with other columns. 21 We thank one anonymous referee for pointing this out.
